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OPINION OF THE COURT
___________________________
BECKER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal requires that we apply the zone of danger
test recently announced in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall,
114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994) to a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.

The claim was brought by plaintiff Jerold E.

Bloom, a railroad employee, against his employer Consolidated
Rail Corporation ("Conrail") under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1986), and
resulted in a large judgment in his favor against Conrail.
Bloom's injuries were caused by the emotional stress that he
suffered after a locomotive engine he was operating struck and
killed a pedestrian.

Because under Gottshall the judgment cannot

stand, we reverse and remand with directions to enter judgment
for Conrail.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Bloom was employed by Conrail as a locomotive engineer
beginning in 1976.

During his employment at Conrail, two of his

trains were involved in fatalities.

The first fatality occurred

in the spring of 1986, when Bloom's engine struck a car and
killed the driver.

Following this fatality, Conrail allowed

Bloom to return to work.

Medical treatment was available through

the health plan, though Conrail did not require psychiatric

desensitization1 or any other kind of treatment, and Bloom did
not seek any.

The second fatality occurred on October 28, 1986,

when Bloom's locomotive struck and killed a pedestrian who
stepped on the tracks to commit suicide.

Even though Bloom felt

faint, lightheaded, and nauseous, a Conrail patrolman required
him to exit the train and verify the point of contact, which was
to Bloom, at that point, a gruesome exercise.

Following the

second fatality, Bloom sought and received psychiatric treatment
covered under the health plan, and underwent extensive counseling
for post traumatic stress disorder and chronic phobia syndrome.
He was never able to resume railroad work.
Bloom brought this FELA action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress in the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.

Conrail twice moved for summary

judgment on grounds that Bloom's claim was not actionable under
FELA.

The district court denied the motions.

At trial, after

the presentation of plaintiff's case, Conrail moved for judgment
as a matter of law on the grounds that Bloom's claim was not
actionable and that there was insufficient evidence of causation.
The motion was denied.

The jury determined that Bloom suffered

$425,000 total damages, of which thirty percent was caused by
Conrail's negligence and seventy percent was caused by the
suicidal pedestrian.
1

The district court entered a $425,000

. One trauma, even if it fails to cause a severe reaction,
apparently may sensitize a person to subsequent traumas. During
psychiatric desensitization treatment, doctors attempt to reduce
a patient's propensity for a sensitized future response to trauma
via counseling and medication.

judgment for Bloom, reasoning that 45 U.S.C. § 51 holds carriers
liable for injuries resulting "in whole or in part" from their
negligence.

Conrail filed post-trial motions requesting judgment

as a matter of law or, alternatively, to amend the judgment to
limit damages.

The district court sua sponte dismissed the

motions for lack of prosecution.
On this appeal Conrail has argued that the district
court erred in not granting judgment as a matter of law because
Bloom's claim is not actionable under FELA in light of Gottshall
(which was decided after the appellate briefs were filed),2 and
because there was no evidence that Conrail caused Bloom's injury.
Conrail also assigns error in the district court's refusal to
apportion damages according to the jury's determination, and
contends that the district court abused its discretion by sua
sponte dismissing Conrail's post-trial motions.

Bloom counters

each of these contentions, and also responds that if Bloom's
claim is not actionable on the present record under Gottshall, we
should remand for further factual findings.3

We limit our

2

. We held the case c.a.v. pending the Supreme Court's
disposition of Gottshall.
3

. On appeal, Bloom has also contended that Conrail's appeal is
not properly before this court because Conrail did not timely
file its notice of appeal. We find Bloom's appellate
jurisdiction arguments plainly without merit. Bloom submits that
Conrail's appeal is not timely because: (1) under Rule 4(a)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ("FRAP"), Conrail's
notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the
district court entered judgment in favor of Bloom and (2) FRAP
4(a)(4) does not apply because Conrail's post-trial motions were
not "timely" since they were dismissed for lack of prosecution
under E.D. Pa. Local Rule 20(e).

discussion to the dispositive question whether Bloom's FELA claim
is actionable in the wake of Gottshall.

This is a question of

law and our review is plenary.

II.
A.

IS BLOOM'S CLAIM ACTIONABLE UNDER FELA?
Gottshall

The Gottshall opinion dealt with two cases, both
emanating from this court, Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
988 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1993) and Carlisle v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 990 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1993).
Like Bloom, James Gottshall was an employee of Conrail.
Gottshall was a track repairman who was assigned along with his
co-workers the task of replacing a stretch of defective track on
an extremely hot and humid afternoon.

During that afternoon

Conrail drove the men to complete their task at an unusually fast
pace and, although water was available, repeatedly discouraged
breaks.

Under these conditions, Gottshall's longtime friend,

Richard Johns, collapsed.

In response, Gottshall administered a

cold compress which enabled Johns to regain consciousness.
(..continued)
We hold that Conrail's notice of appeal was timely
filed within the thirty-day appeal period of FRAP 4(a)(4). Our
holding here is controlled by Osei-Afriyie v. Medical College of
Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1991). In Osei-Afriyie, we
held that a notice of appeal was timely when it was filed more
than thirty days after the judgment date, but within thirty days
of the district court's dismissal of post-trial motions for lack
of prosecution under E.D. Pa. Local Rule 20(e). In this case,
like Osei-Afriyie, Conrail's notice of appeal was filed more than
30 days after the judgment date, but within 30 days of the
district court's dismissal of post-trial motions for lack of
prosecution under E.D. Pa. Local Rule 20(e). Therefore, like the
appeal in Osei-Afriyie, it is timely under FRAP 4(a)(4).

Following this incident, Conrail ordered the men, except Johns,
back to work.

Five minutes later, Johns again collapsed.

Gottshall again rushed to assist him and, realizing that his
friend was having a heart attack, administered CPR.

The

supervisor tried the radio to call paramedics, but it had been
taken offline for repair.

By the time help arrived Johns had

died at Gottshall's side.

The men were then again ordered back

to work, with Johns' sheet-covered corpse left in view along the
tracks.
The next day, Conrail reprimanded Gottshall for
administering CPR, and over the days that followed, Conrail
worked the crew as hard under similar conditions.

Gottshall

subsequently left work, secluded himself in his basement, and
spent three weeks in a psychiatric institution where he was
treated for major depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.
He exhibited suicidal preoccupations, anxiety, insomnia, appetite
loss, physical weakness, nightmares, and weight loss.
We reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment for Conrail and remanded for trial.

We reasoned that,

when considering the totality of the extreme facts, Gottshall's
claim had sufficient indicia of genuineness of emotional injury
to be cognizable under FELA, and that genuine issues of material
fact existed regarding breach of duty, injury, and causation.
Judge Roth dissented.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and

determined that the common-law "zone of danger" test is the
proper standard for evaluating whether a railroad employer has a
legal duty in negligent infliction of emotional distress claims

under FELA.

Since that test was different from and narrower than

this court's test, the Court reversed and remanded for
reconsideration.
B.

Carlisle

Alan Carlisle began working for Conrail as a train
dispatcher in 1976.

His job was to ensure timely and safe

movement of passengers and cargo.

A 1984 reduction in force,

combined with aging railstock and equipment, increased his job
stress and responsibility.

Conrail constantly pressured Carlisle

to achieve on-time performance and instructed him to ignore
safety concerns that would slow the movement of trains.

In 1988,

Carlisle additionally became trainmaster in the South
Philadelphia yards, where he troubleshot trains in dangerous
areas over erratic hours.

He began to experience insomnia,

fatigue, headaches, depression, sleep walking, and weight loss.
After working 12-15 hour days for 15 straight weeks, his stressrelated problems culminated in a nervous breakdown.
We affirmed the jury award of $386,500 in damages,
reasoning that Carlisle's claim had sufficient indicia of
genuineness of emotional injury and that it was reasonably
foreseeable that extended exposure to the dangerous and stressful
working conditions would cause injury.

We therefore upheld his

FELA claim for negligent infliction of emotional injuries arising
from work-related stress.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In contrast to Gottshall, which resulted in a remand for further
consideration in light of the newly announced standard, the Court
in Carlisle not only reversed, but also remanded with

instructions to enter judgment for Conrail, explaining that
Conrail had no legal duty since Carlisle plainly was not in the
zone of danger.
C.

The Zone of Danger Test

The Supreme Court adopted the zone of danger test, in
part, to limit defendants' liability to certain classes of
plaintiffs and to certain types of harm, notwithstanding that
some genuine claims would be foreclosed.

Gottshall, 114 S. Ct.

at 2408-09. In justifying these limitations, the Court wrote:
Our FELA cases require that we look to the
common law when considering the right to
recover asserted by respondents, and the
common law restricts recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress on several
policy grounds: the potential for a flood of
trivial suits, the possibility of fraudulent
claims that are difficult for judges and
juries
to
detect,
and
the
specter
of
unlimited and unpredictable liability.

Id. at 2411.

The Court concluded that these policy

considerations "accord with the concerns that have motivated our
FELA jurisprudence."

Id.

To effectuate these goals, the Court defined the zone
of danger test as follows:

"The zone of danger test limits

recovery for emotional injury to those plaintiffs who sustain a
physical impact as a result of a defendant's negligent conduct,
or who are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that
conduct."

Id. at 2406 (emphasis added).

Unfortunately, using

different language seemingly in tension with the foregoing, the
Court later explained:

"Railroad employees thus will be able to

recover for injuries--physical and emotional--caused by the
negligent conduct of their employers that threatens them
imminently with physical impact."

Id. at 2411 (emphasis added).

Thus it is unclear whether the zone of danger test turns (in the
absence of actual physical impact) on risk of physical impact or
risk of physical harm.
In the course of its opinion, the Court made several
other pertinent observations.

The Court stated that "[u]nder

this test, a worker within the zone of danger of physical impact
will be able to recover for emotional injury caused by fear of
physical injury to himself, whereas the worker outside the zone
will not,"

id. at 2410-11 (emphasis added),

However, again

using different language, the Court later stated that

"[w]e see

no reason . . . to allow an employer to escape liability for
emotional injury caused by apprehension of physical impact . . .
."

Id. at 2411 (emphasis added).

Then, the Court noted that

"[t]he zone of danger test is consistent with FELA's central
focus on physical perils,"

id. at 2410, and that "the rule will

further Congress' goal of alleviating the physical dangers of
id. at 2411, but this passage fails to clear up

railroading,"
the confusion.

The Court also instructed that the "zone of danger test
announced today"
precedent."

should be applied "in light of common-law

Id. at 2411.

Similarly, in a concurring opinion,

Justice Souter emphasized that we should "develop a federal
common law of negligence under FELA, informed by reference to the
evolving common law."

Id. at 2412 (Souter, J., concurring).

We

take this as an injunction to look at common-law precedent, state
and federal, and to build upon it.
In sum, Gottshall mandates application of the commonlaw zone of danger test to determine whether a railroad employer
has a legal duty that would enable negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims to be made under FELA.

As we have

pointed out, the Supreme Court's language is in important
respects opaque and confusing in that it is unclear whether
plaintiffs must be placed in immediate risk of physical harm4 or
whether plaintiffs must be imminently threatened with physical
impact.5

Although these concerns are not outcome determinative

4

. It is also unclear whether the Court would require the
plaintiff to actually fear physical injury (to himself) as a
prima facie element (absent physical impact) or would just
consider fear in determining damages. While the Court appears to
have adopted the damages approach (by stating that "a worker in
the zone of danger of physical impact will be able to recover for
emotional injury caused by fear of physical injury to himself,"
Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. at 2410-11), we note that some common-law
zone of danger tests include fear as a prima facie element. See,
e.g., Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84, 90 (Pa. 1970). Though
it does not appear under the facts of this case that Bloom feared
physical injury to himself, we need not reach the issue, since we
hold that Bloom fails to otherwise qualify under other aspects of
the enunciated test.
5

. Finally, it is also unclear, inter alia, whether by this
language ("physical impact") the Court would require a
plaintiff's initial injuries to be physically manifested. Many
zone of danger jurisdictions "require that a plaintiff
demonstrate a 'physical manifestation' of an alleged emotional
injury, that is, a physical injury or effect that is the direct
result of the emotional injury, in order to recover." Gottshall,
114 S. Ct. at 2407 n.11 (citing Garvis v. Employers Mut. Casualty
Co., 497 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 1993)). However, under Gottshall's
formulation, it is not clear whether physical manifestation is an
element. In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Buell,
107 S. Ct. 1410, 1418 & n.22 (1987), the Supreme Court hinted but

here, we hope the Supreme Court will clarify them in its next
FELA emotional distress case.
D.

Discussion

In applying Gottshall to this case, it is necessary
that we assess:

(1) whether Bloom sustained a physical impact;

or (2) whether Bloom was placed in immediate risk of physical
harm (or alternatively whether Bloom was threatened imminently
with physical impact).
1.
Under the zone of danger test announced by the Court in
Gottshall, Conrail has a legal duty if Bloom sustained a physical
impact.

Bloom argues that he sustained a physical impact because

the locomotive engine struck the pedestrian, and he could hear
the thump. Bloom further argues any physical impact, no matter
(..continued)
failed to decide, whether physical manifestation is required
under FELA. Ultimately, we also need not reach this issue
because, in light of common law precedent, Bloom did demonstrate
physical manifestation through weight loss, loss of sleep,
nightmares, vomiting, and diagnosed post-traumatic stress
disorder. See, e.g., Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1164
(Colo. 1978) (en banc) (nightmares, sleepwalking, nervousness,
and irritability showed sufficient physical manifestation);
Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 234 A.2d 656, 657, 660 (Vt. 1967)
(nervous shock, sleeplessness, weight loss, faintness, and
trembling showed sufficient physical manifestation); Daley v.
LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390, 395-96 (Mich. 1970) (weight loss,
inability to perform household duties, extreme nervousness, and
irritability are facts from which jury could find physical
injury); Johnson v. State, 334 N.E.2d 590, 591 (N.Y. 1975)
(recurrent nightmares, difficulty in concentrating, irritability,
inability to function properly at work, tenseness, anxiety, and
psychiatric confirmation of emotional distress showed objective
manifestations of the injury).

how slight, suffices, citing Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d
72, 76-77 (3d Cir. 1978), where the plaintiff was negligently
exposed to potentially lethal tuberculosis.
76.

Plummer, 580 F.2d at

Conrail counters that Bloom did not sustain a physical

impact because at all times he safely rode in the locomotive's
cab, and, while the pedestrian was physically impacted by the
train, Bloom was not.

We agree.

As Conrail submits, Bloom rode safely in the
locomotive's cab, and the physical impact was between the train
and the pedestrian.

Even if the "no-matter-how-slight" standard

applies, Bloom's claim would unavailingly stretch the broadest
common-law cases.6
6

Even Stoddard v. Davidson, 513 A.2d 419 (Pa.

. Under the common law, courts applying the physical impact
test developed the "no-matter-how-slight" standard to prevent
sometimes harsh results in near-miss situations. Thus, physical
impact was found in some tenuous circumstances. W. Page Keeton
et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 363-64 (5th ed.
1988) (" 'Impact' has meant a slight blow, a trifling burn or
electric shock, a trivial jolt or jar, a forcible seating on the
floor, dust in the eye, or inhalation of smoke.") (citations
omitted); see, e.g., Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 62 N.E.
737 (Mass. 1902) (slight blow); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co.
v. Roman's Guardian, 23 S.W.2d 272 (Ky. 1929) (trifling burn);
Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980) (x-rays of pregnant
woman); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 175 A.2d 351 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961)
(jostling of occupants in low-speed car collision); Porter v.
Delaware, Lackawanna W. R.R. Co., 63 A. 860 (N.J. 1906) (dust in
eye); Morton v. Stack, 170 N.E. 869 (Ohio 1930) (smoke
inhalation). Other courts applying the physical impact test,
however, have not extended it so far. See, e.g., Williams v.
Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1064 n.8 (D.C. 1990) ("We use the term
'impact' in this discussion and throughout the opinion in its
ordinary use, just as its use has developed under the impact
rule. It means a violent physical contact, a striking together,
a collision.") (citing Webster's New World Dictionary 703 (2d ed.
1984)).
As courts increasingly adopted the zone of danger test, the
need to stretch the definition of physical impact dissipated.
Some zone of danger jurisdictions, however, do include the no-

Super. Ct. 1986), where it was held that the plaintiff sustained
a "physical impact" when he was jostled as a result of his motor
vehicle running over a corpse left in the road, is
distinguishable in terms of extent of the impact.7

Moreover,

Plummer is also distinguishable because it is a toxic exposure
case involving the threat of future physical harm -- not an
accident case like this one.

So then, Bloom did not sustain a

physical impact, and hence we turn to the other facets of the
test.
2.
Under the zone of danger test announced by the Supreme
Court in Gottshall, Conrail may have a legal duty to Bloom if he
was placed in immediate risk of physical harm or if Bloom was
threatened imminently with physical impact.

Compare Towns v.

Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163 (Colo. 1979) (boy on porch of home
destroyed by explosion and fire who experienced no direct
physical impact was subjected to "unreasonable risk of bodily
harm"); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 210 A.2d 709 (Del. 1965)
(woman who lodged car in rut on train track and jumped prior to
collision but who experienced no direct physical impact was
(..continued)
matter-how-slight qualifier in the physical impact prong of the
zone of danger test. See Plummer, 580 F.2d at 76 (quoting Kahle
v. Glosser Bros., 462 F.2d 815, 817 (3d Cir. 1972)).
Importantly, in Gottshall, the Supreme Court included the nomatter-how-slight qualifier when defining the physical impact
test but did not include it when defining the zone of danger
test. Gottshall, 114 S. Ct. at 2406.
7

. Moreover, the Stoddard panel was seriously divided. Judge
Brosky wrote the opinion of the court, Judge Johnson dissented,
and Judge Lipez concurred in the result without opinion.

"within the immediate zone of physical risk") with Resavage v.
Davies, 86 A.2d 879 (Md. 1952) (mother who, from porch, watched
child get hit by car was not subjected to unreasonable risk of
bodily harm); Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980)
(parents who, from a few yards away, watched child get hit by car
not in "zone of danger of physical impact"); Asaro v. Cardinal
Glennon Memorial Hosp., 799 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1990) (mother who
sustained emotional injury after child was mistreated at hospital
was not "threatened with bodily harm").

While Bloom contends

that he met this test, Conrail counters that Bloom was not placed
in immediate risk of physical harm because at all times he safely
rode in the locomotive's cab.

We agree, and conclude Bloom was

neither placed in immediate risk of physical harm nor threatened
imminently with physical impact.

III.

CONCLUSION

In sum, we hold that the district court erred as a
matter of law in denying Conrail's motion for judgment as a
matter of law because Bloom's evidence fails to establish any set
of facts actionable under FELA in light of the zone of danger
test announced by the Supreme Court in Gottshall.

Accordingly,

we will reverse the judgment and remand with instructions to
enter judgment for Conrail.8
8

. Bloom contends that if we find insufficient evidence in the
record to support a finding of physical impact or zone of danger,
then the appropriate remedy is a new trial because "[a] new trial
will permit Mr. Bloom to present evidence that was not relevant
under this Court's decision and that did not become relevant
until the Gottshall decision was rendered on June 24, 1994."

_____________________________

(..continued)
Supplemental Brief of Appellee at 5 n.4. But in making this
argument, Bloom neither proffers nor suggests what new evidence
is now relevant and would be introduced in light of Gottshall.
Hence we reject this argument.

